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Valuation of Partial Taking In
Condemnation: A Need For
Legislative Review
EDWARD J. CONNOR, JR.*
As this article points out, one of the most difficult problems of cur-
rent condemnation law is the ascertainment of "just compensation"
for partial condemnation. The author sets out in detailed analysis
the peculiarities of California valuation practice in this area; what
are legally compensable factors; when is a benefit considered spe-
cial; will the court consider a general benefit; what is the effect
of Code of Civil Procedure section 1248 requiring the jury to find
separate values for the part taken, the damages, and the benefits
before the court derives a total by combining the separate values?
These and other problems as the offset of benefits against the value
of the part taken lead the author to conclude that very often the
value derived results in a windfall to the condemnee who receives
more than the value of just compensation for the whole. The arti-
cle exemplifies by review of important judicial decisions from Cali-
fornia and other jurisdictions, the overwhelming confusion in the
procedures used to determine the value of the part taken, the dam-
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ages and the benefits. Finally, in pointing up the need for reform
in California, the author suggests consideration be given to the fed-
eral before and after rule as a guide to determine just compensa-
tion.
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The Constitution of the State of California provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use without "just compensation"
having been first paid to the owner.' However, the constitution does
not seek to define what constitutes just compensation nor does it state
how it shall be measured. This has been left to the courts and the legis-
lature.2 But where private property is taken for public use, it is uni-
versally agreed that the compensation required is to be measured in
,' 3terms of "fair market value.
The classic definition of fair market value is contained in Sacramento
Southern Railroad Company v. Heilbron.4 There the court held that
fair market value is
the highest price estimated in terms of money which the land would
bring if exposed for sale in the open market, with reasonable time
allowed in which to find a purchaser, buying with knowledge of all
of the uses and purposes to which it was adapted and for which it
was capable.5
Thus, where an entire parcel of property is being taken, it becomes the
function of the trier of fact to attempt to determine what the property
would have sold for on the open market. Ordinarily, appraisers or
other persons qualified to express such opinions are called by the respec-
tive parties, although by California statute the property owner himself
is qualified to state an opinion.' At the conclusion of such a trial,
the jury will merely be asked to provide its answer to the singular ques-
tion of what constitutes the fair market value of the property.
All condemnation cases are not, however, this simple. A public
agency does not always require a person's entire property, and when a
1 The California Constitution, article I, section 14, provides in part as follows:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation having been first made to, or paid into Court for, the owner...
which compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived,
as in other civil cases in a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law ...
2 Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 269 (1965).
3 Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 737 (1942); State of California v.
Covich, 260 Cal. App. 2d 663, 665 (1968); CAL. EviD. CODE § 814.
4 156 Cal. 408 (1909).
5 Id. at 409. It should also be observed that the 5th amendment to the United
States Constitution, like the California Constitution, provides for "just compensation".
Again this term is not defined, but the federal courts, like the California courts, have
held that "just compensation" contemplates "fair market value". See Olson v. United
States, 292 U.S. 246 (1933).
0 CAL. Evm. CODE § 813.
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property owner is left with a part of his property, 7 there is an en-
tirely different and far more complex problem presented. Any attor-
ney who practices condemnation law knows that although a total
taking case may have its difficulties, it is the partial taking case that is
likely to lead to interminable legal problems. And the majority of the
difficult appraisal and legal problems which have been faced by the
California appellate courts arise in these "partial taking" cases.
When only a portion of a man's property is taken, the determination
of just compensation not only requires that attention be given to the
part taken, consideration also must be given to the impact of the acqui-
sition project on the part not taken. This is for the reason that the prop-
erty owner is entitled to compensation for the total injury caused by
removal of the part needed for the project which includes the effect
that the project may have on his remainder.8 Again, the standard is
fair market value and the basic test is one of diminution in value.9
The analysis, however, can become quite complicated because the
courts have long held that not all injurious effects may be considered.
Certain types of depreciation in value have been held to be noncom-
pensable. In Rose v. State,'0 the state supreme court rejected the rule,
accepted in some states, that loss in value may be established by testi-
mony relating to any factor which would make the property less de-
sirable in the eyes of a prospective purchaser. An excellent summary
of this area of the law and of some of the various types of non-
compensable damages is contained in Sacramento and San Joaquin
Drainage District Ex rel. The State Reclamation Board v. Reed."
There the court also discussed the effect that these rules have on the
trial of a condemnation lawsuit. The court said that "translated into
concrete rules of evidence, these concepts have been described in
terms of restrictions on opinion evidence of market value."' 2  The
court went on to hold that a value opinion based upon depreciation at-
tributed to legally noncompensable factors should be excluded and that
where cross-examination reveals that loss-of-value testimony is based
on noncompensable items, the testimony should be stricken.' 3
Similarly, not all beneficial features which may result from a pro-
7 Such "portions" left to the property pwner after partial takings by public
agencies are generally referred to as "remainders".
8 People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390 (1943); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548
(1897).
9 Prople v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390 (1943).
10 19 Cal. 2d 713 (1942).
11 215 Cal. App. 2d 60 (1963).
12 Id. at 64.
13 Id. See also CAL. EviD. CODE § 822(e).
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posed public improvement can be considered in determining the
amount of the ultimate loss. Only "special benefits", those benefits
which directly enhance the value of the property remaining after con-
demnation, can be offset. Those benefits which are "general"; benefits
accruing to the community or the neighborhood as a whole, cannot be
offset. 14
It is thus apparent that attorneys, judges, appraisers and, of course,
the lay jurors who must ultimately decide these cases, are faced with no
easy task of analysis. They must continuously exclude from their
thinking elements which may in fact affect market value, but which may
not be considered in the final determination. To this already compli-
cated undertaking must be added a requirement of California law which
provides that in partial taking cases the value of the part taken, the dam-
ages to the remainder (called severence damages), and the benefits to
the remainder, must all be separately determined. This is specifically
provided for by Code of Civil Procedure section 124815 Under
this rule, the loss to the owner's entire property cannot be deter-
mined by simply finding its fair market value before the condemna-
tion and deducting therefrom its fair market value afterwards. Instead,
14 Beveridge v. Lewis, 137 Cal. 619 (1902); City of Hayward v. Unger, 194
Cal. App. 2d 516 (1961). In Unger, the court stated at 518:
The bases for refusing offset of general benefits are usually stated to be the
unfairness of charging only to condemnees benefits which accrue to the en-
tire neighborhood or community, and the uncertainty and speculation involved
in attempting to apportion such benefits.
The court also noted that the distinction between general and special benefits is
by no means clearly drawn. For a more complete discussion of the differences see
Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District v. W.P. Roduner Cattle & Farming
Company, 268 Cal. App. 2d 199 (1968).
15 See CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1248, which provides in part:
The court, jury, or referee must hear such legal testimony as may be offered
by any of the parties to the proceeding, and thereupon must ascertain and
assess:
1. Value. The value of the property sought to be condemned, and all im-
provements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate
estate or interest therein; if it consists of different parcels, the value of each
parcel and each estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed;
2. Severance damages. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes
only a part of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion
not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion
sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff;
3. Benefits. Separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned,
and each estate or interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the con-
struction of the improvement proposed by the plaintiffs. If the benefit shall
be equal to the damages assessed under subdivision 2, the owner of the
parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the portion
taken. If the benefit shall be less than the damages so assessed, the former
shall be deducted from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only dam-
ages allowed in addition to the value. If the benefit shall be greater than the
damages so assessed, the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensa-
tion except the value of the portion taken, but the benefit shall in no event be
deducted from the value of the portion taken.
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separate values must be assigned to each element. When this is done,
the jury's task is completed. The actual computation of the award
is made by the court. 16
It thus becomes the task of the jurors in a condemnation case to not
only segregate the compensable from the noncompensable, and to dif-
ferentiate between the general benefits and the special benefits, but
they must also seek to divide the net loss into three separate compart-
ments. Moreover, in so doing, they are told that they are to follow
the fair market value standard, although their segregation of the vari-
ous portions of the loss cannot be related to anything that happens in
the real market place.
Therefore, it is not surprising that there has been some legitimate in-
quiry as to whether the present rules truly lead to findings of "just com-
pensation" and as to whether there may be a need for reform.17 The
problems inherent in a partial taking case are sufficiently mind-boggling
to scare the average practitioner away from the prospect of trying such
cases. The result is that the field of condemnation law is being handled
almost entirely by specialists. This, in itself, is obviously unfortunate,
but of even greater concern is the fact that the handling of condemna-
tion cases by specialists does not insure that these problems will be ade-
quately understood and resolved by lay jurors.
Most certainly, not all of the problems in condemnation cases can be
corrected by merely legislating them away. A just result would not fol-
low from permitting a jury to consider any and all losses that may accrue
generally to properiy merely because a portion of the property is
needed for a public project.' 8 And although the distinction between
special and general benefits is "by no means clearly drawn", 10 no direct
consideration will be given herein to the question of whether the law
should be changed to allow all benefits to offset.20 It is believed,
however, that California unfortunately has become wedded to the con-
cept that special benefits should not be offset against the value of the
part taken. This led to the three-pronged analysis of compensation
which has been at the root of many conceptual problems which have
16 Contra Costa County Water District v. Zuckerman Construction Company,
240 Cal. App. 2d 908, 909 (1966).
17 See, e.g., Gleaves, Special Benefits in Eminent Domain; Phantom of the
Opera, 40 CAL. S.B.J. 245 (1965), State of California v. Wherity, 275 A.C.A. 279, 290
(1969).
18 See Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal. 2d 713 (1942); People v. Symons, 54
Cal. 2d 855 (1960).
19 City of Hayward v. Linger, 194 Cal. App. 2d 516, 518 (1961).
20 This has, however, been suggested. See Haar and Hering, The Determination
of Benefits in Land Acquisition, 51 CAL. L. Rv. 833 (1963).
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not been rationally resolved. Moreover, it is believed that this rule
frequently leads to the payment of a greater amount than "just compen-
sation", and that strong consideration should, therefore, be given to
altering, through legislation, California's present rule as set forth in Code
of Civil Procedure section 1248.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT
The basic purpose underlying the concept of "just compensation" in
a total taking case is to replace the value of the real property taken with
an equivalent value in the form of money. Likewise, in a partial taking
case, the goal is to provide the owner with an award in money so that in
the end he will have a sum of money which, together with his remaining
real property, will have a combined value equal to the total value of the
property he had before. He should not be left poorer, but neither
should he be made richer. Thus, the basic concept is one which re-
lates to the entire parcel of property.
This concept was expressed in City of Los Angeles v. Harper2' as
follows:
The clear intention of the constitutional provision is that the
owner of property taken under the power of eminent domain shall
be made whole for his lossand shall be recompensed in an amount
of money equal to the actual loss which he has suffered by reason of
such condemnation. It does not contemplate that such an owner
may make a profit over and above the detriment, expressed in
dollars and cents, that he has sustained.22 (Emphasis added.)
This same concept was also discussed in United States v. Miller,3
where the United States Supreme Court held that "just compensation"
requires payment to the property owner of an amount which will put
him "in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his
property had not been taken. '2 4  The court analyzed the situation as
follows:
Courts have had to adopt working rules in order to do substantial
justice in eminent domain proceedings.. One of these is that a par-
cel of land which has been used and treated as an entity shall be so
considered in assessing compensation for the taking of part or all
of it.25
Of course, it is immediately obvious that in California, whenever the
benefits from a condemnation project exceed the amount of damages,
21 139 Cal. App. 331 (1934).
22 Id. at 334.
23 317 U.S. 369 (1942).
24 Id. at 373.
25 Id. at 375-6.
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the property owner will end up with a greater total value than he had
before, since benefits cannot be offset against the part taken. In such a
case, the benefits thus constitute a windfall to the property owner to
the extent that they exceed severance damages.
By way of comparison, under the federal rule, the test is simply one of
deducting the after value of the property from its before value. The
difference constitutes "just compensation" and special benefits are thus
offset against both the value of the part taken and the severance dam-
ages.2 6 The states are closely divided on the question of which rule
is the proper one.27
The leading case in support of the federal "before and after" rule is
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Bauman v. Ross. 2
There the court fully explored the question of whether or not benefits
should be offset against the part taken. The court stated:
Consequently, when part only of a parcel of land is taken for a
highway, the value of that part is not the sole measure of the
compensation or damages to be paid to the owner; but the inci-
dental injury or benefit to the part not taken is also to be consid-
ered. When the part not taken is left in such shape or condition,
as to be in itself of less value than before, the owner is entitled to
additional damages on that account. When, on the other hand,
the part which he retains is specially and directly increased in value
by the public improvement, the damages to the whole parcel by
the appropriation of part of it are lessened. 29
The court held that the amount of just compensation required by
the constitution to be paid to the owner ". . . is to be measured by the
loss caused to him by the appropriation. He is entitled to receive the
value of what he has been deprived of, and no more. . . ." The court
said: "To award him less would be unjust to him, to award him more
would be unjust to the public. '30
It is important to note that the court in Bauman considered the con-
cept of "just compensation" as not applicable solely to the property
owner. The court specifically observed that the compensation for prop-
erty must also be just ". . . to the public which is to pay for it."' 31
The California courts have likewise held that the concept of "just com-
pensation" means "just" not only to the person whose property is taken
26 Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
27 See Yager, Just Compensation, RIGHT OF WAY, Dec., 1964, at 19; 3 NICHOLS
ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.6206 at 90, et seq. (rev. 3d ed. 1965).28 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
29 Id. at 574.
30 Id. at 574.
31 Id. at 574.
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but also "just" to the public which is to pay for it.32
Modem authority following the federal rule is found in a recent Ken-
tucky decision, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of Highways
v. Sherrod.33  There the court reanalyzed its state constitution and de-
clared certain legislative enactments, which had previously prohibited
any offsetting of special benefits against the value of the part taken, to
be unconstitutional. The court concluded that an owner's "property"
is taken in condemnation ". . . only to the extent he has lost value.134
The court also took note of the fact that many states (like California)
permit benefits to be offset against damages but not against the part
taken. The court said, however, that it could find ". . . no sense in
this rule, because it simply means that benefits may be set off against
loss of an intangible but not against loss of a tangible. The reality of the
loss is the same in either case, so we can find no basis for the distinc-
tion." 5 The court ultimately concluded that prohibiting such an offset
would actually violate the constitutional mandate of just compensa-
tion and concluded in favor of the "before and after" rule.36
Interestingly enough, California started out as a "before and after"
state. Before the 1872 enactment of California Code of Civil Procedure
section 1248, the California Supreme Court in San Francisco; Alameda
and Stockton Railroad Company v. CaldweI 7 reached the same con-
clusion as was later reached by the United States Supreme Court in Bau-
man v. Ross.35 The Court, in Caldwell, examined the arguments on
both sides of the question, 9 and concluded that the reasons in support
32 People v. Pera, 190 Cal. App. 2d 497, 499-500 (1961).
33 367 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1963).
34 Id. at 857.
35 Id. at 857.
36 Id. at 857. In a later case the Kentucky court in Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Department of Highways v. Lawton, 440 S.W.2d 778 (1969), reinforced the Sherrod
rule, by stating at 779:
The simple point that this court has been trying to make clear is that
"after" value is to be determined by the value features that the property has
after the condemnation, not by the value features it does not have; the value is
to be placed on what is there, rather than what is not there; the question is
the value of what is left, not what was taken away. We are striving for a
positive valuation instead of a negative one. (Emphasis by the court.)
37 31 Cal. 368 (1866).
38 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
39 San Francisco, Alameda and Stockton Railroad Company v. Caldwell, 31 Cal.
367, 374 (1866):
On the one side it has been maintained that compensation to the extent of
the value of the land taken must be made in all cases, without any deduction
on account of any benefit or advantage which may accrue to other property
of the owner, by reason of the public improvement for which the property is
taken. [Citations Omitted.]
In support of this view it is argued that the enhancement of the value of
other property of the owner of the land proposed to be condemned to public
use, which may by of the parcel of that taken, is merely the measure of such
owner's share in the general good produced by the public improvement; and
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of the view allowing benefits to be offset were "unanswerable". The
court concluded that "just compensation" requires a full indemnity
and nothing more.40
Following CaIdwell, in 1879, article I, section 14, of the California
Constitution was adopted. Although the 1879 constitution, like its
predecessor, the 1849 constitution, continued to specifically refer to
"just compensation", it also contained a specific prohibition against off-
setting benefits in any case where a right of way was being acquired by
any corporation other than a municipal corporation.41 The present con-
stitution still continues the prohibition against private corporations.
It has been suggested that the constitutional retreat from the Cald-
well concept of "just compensation", insofar as private corporations
were concerned, was aimed primarily at the railroads.42 Indeed, it
would appear that the reason California and other states departed from
the simple "before and after" rule was a result of numerous railroad
acquisitions during the latter half of the nineteenth century and a change
in public attitude towards these private, profit-making corporations.43
The 1879 constitution did not state what the rule would be for
condemners other than private corporations. However, Code of Civil
Procedure section 1248, and its separate assessment requirement,
had by 1872 already been enacted. Although it was generally as-
sumed over the years that benefits could not be offset against the part
taken under the statute, it was not until 1966 that the issue was squarely
decided in Contra Costa County Water District v. Zuckerman Con-
struction Company.44  As this case pointed out, a 1964 Los Angeles
Superior Court case had previously concluded that Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 1248, as it then read, did not specifically prohibit off-
why, it is asked, is not the owner in such case justly entitled to the increase
in the value of the property thus fortuitously occasioned, without paying for it?
His share in the benefits resulting may be larger than falls to the lot of others
owning property in the same vicinity, and it may not be so large, and yet he
alone is made to contribute to the improvement by a deduction from the
compensation which is awarded him by sovereign behest as a pure matter of
right, though others whose property may adjoin the public work are equally
with himself benefited by it. On the other side it is maintained that the
public is only dealing with those whose property is necessarily taken for public
use, and that if the property of such persons immediately connected with
that taken, but which remains unappropriated, is enhanced in value by reason
of the improvement then, thereby the owners receive a just compensation for
the lands taken to the extent of such enhancement, and if thereby fully com-
pensated they cannot in justice ask for anything more. [Citations Omitted.]
40 Id. at 375.
41 See Yager, supra note 27.
42 Id. at 20. See also Note, Benefits and Just Compensation in California, 20
HASnNGs L.J. 764 (1969).
43 See Yager, supra note 27; 1 ORGEL ON VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 7, at 40, et seq. (2d ed. 1953).
44 240 Cal. App. 2d 908 (1966).
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setting special benefits against the part taken. But the appellate
court in Zuckerman Construction Company decided that section 1248
could only be interpreted as prohibiting such an offset and that Cald-
well was "in effect overruled" by the statute.4 5 It is interesting to note
that the legislature in 1965 also reacted to the Los Angeles Superior
Court decision and amended subdivision 3 of section 1248 to specific-
ally prohibit the offsetting of benefits against the part taken. '  The
amendment was enacted after the trial in Zuckerman Construction Com-
pany, but before the appellate court decision. The appellate court
held, however, that the amendment did nothing more than restate the
existing law.
Although California is presently committed to a rule requiring sep-
arate assessment, this does not necessarily mean that each element must
be decided independently of the other. Code of Civil Procedure section
1248 may require that the trier of fact assess separately the value of the
part taken but this does not mean that it has to be valued as a separate
parcel. Since the basic concepts of just compensation are unaffected,
it would still seem to follow that the "entire parcel" concept requires
that the primary focus of the valuation testimony be on the effect
that the condemnation has on the entire property.47  Thus, in theory,
the California rule should give the same result as the simple "before and
after" rule-at least in those cases where there are no benefits or where
benefits do not exceed severance damages.48
One of the leading handbooks on condemnation appraising49 thus de-
scribes California as following a "modified before and after" rule. 50
Under this rule, the usual appraisal technique involves the following
determinations:
(1) The fair market value of the entire property in its before con-
dition.
(2) The amount of this total value attributable to the part taken.
45 Id. at 912.
46 CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 51, p. 932:
If the benefit shall be greater than the damages so assessed, the owner
of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the por-
tion taken, but the benefits shall in no event be deducted from the value of
the portion taken;
47 See Napa Union High School District v. Lewis, 158 Cal. App. 2d 69, 72
(1958), where the court said at 72 quoting from 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 14.1[2], at 494 (rev. 3d ed. 1962):
The entire tract is considered as a whole and the effect of the condemnation
and the projected use evaluated so that determination can be made of what he
[the property owner] had prior to the proceeding and what he had left there-
after.
48 See 4 NICHOLS, supra note 47 at § 14,23211.
49 G. SCHMUTZ, CONDEMNATION APPRAISAL HANDBOOK (rev. ed. 1963).
5o Id. at 97-99.
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(3) The amount of this total value attributable to the remainder as
part of the entire property in its before condition.
(4) The fair market value of the remainder in its after condition
without regard to benefits, which, when deducted from (3)
above, gives the amount of severance damages.
(5) Special benefits.5 1
Inherent in this" procedure is the fundamental concept that, except
where benefits exceed severance damages, the sum of the parts can
never exceed the whole. In line with this concept, many cases have
held that the part taken must be valued as a part of the whole.5 2  It
has similarly been held that severance damages are determined by ascer-
taining the market value of the remaining property in its before condi-
tion as a part of the whole. 53  Nevertheless, because of the require-
ment of separate determination, there is always a temptation on the part
of lay jurors to forget the "entire parcel" concept of just compensation.
And this fact, together with the fact that on occasion the California
courts have likewise succumbed to this same temptation, has led to
some considerable difficulties.
PROBLEMS IN SEPARATELY ASSESSING THE VALUE OF THE TAKING
Theoretically, there are only two ways in which the part taken can
be separately valued. First, it can be viewed as an independent parcel,
as divorced from the whole. Second, it can be valued as a part of the
whole.54 Few courts following the California rule of separate assess-
ment have adopted the first method." As a practical matter, partial
takings generally are of such unusual size and shape as to have little
or no independent value. Nor can one ordinarily find comparable sales
by which to judge such parcels. For example, a street widening may
involve a parcel 3 feet wide by 100 feet long. Such a parcel cannot be
given an independent value for it would not be salable as such. In fact,
to do so would constitute a complete repudiation of the basic concept of
51 Id. See also Sacramento Southern Railroad Company v. Heilbron, 156 Cal.
408, 414 (1909).
52 See City of Los Angeles v. Allen, 1 Cal. 2d 572 (1934); Napa Union High
School District v. Lewis, 158 Cal. App. 2d 69 (1958); People v. Loop, 127 Cal. App.
2d 786 (1954); Hayward Union High School District v. Lemos, 187 Cal. App. 2d
348 (1960); City of Downey v. Royal, 215 Cal. App. 523 (1963). As Loop points
out, this does not mean that the part taken must necessarily be valued as an average
part of the whole, for differences in the relative value of different parts of the property
must be considered. What is meant is that the value of the part taken will be based
on that amount of the overall value attributable to the part taken.
53 San Bemadino County Flood Control District v. Sweet, 255 Cal. App. 2d
889, 904 (1967).
54 1 ORGEL, supra note 43, § 52 at 236. See also ScHmuTz, supra note 49, at
96-99.
55 But see, State v. Carpenter, 89 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. 1936).
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"just compensation" which looks to the impact of the acquisition on the
entire property. Under an independent value approach, the sum of the
parts would rarely equal the value of the whole and, in most instances,
would add up to much less than the value of the whole.5 6
The California courts, like most other courts following the separate
assessment requirement, have generally adhered to the entire parcel con-
cept. As mentioned earlier, this has been done by attmpting to value
the part taken as a part of the whole and this rule has been followed, not
only to protect the 'property owner, but to protect the public as well.
A typical situation where the property owner would stand to benefit
greatly under the independent parcel rule is where the utility of the prop-
erty taken will be replaced on the part not taken. This frequently oc-
curs when a street or highway is widened, moving the strip of more valu-
able frontage further to the rear. In fact, this very situation was of pri-
mary concern to the United States Supreme Court in reaching its deci-
sion in the Bauman case.5" This also was the basic factual situation
before the California Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles v. Allen.58
In Allen, the plaintiff city sought to condemn a strip of land for the
purpose of widening Santa Monica Boulevard, a major street in Los
Angeles. The defendant owned approximately 38.6 acres of land
which was about 2,000 feet deep with 800 feet of'frontage on Santa
Monica Boulevard. The strip taken was about 33 feet deep. There
was no attempt to value the parcel as if separately owned, the court
observing a "tacit assumption on both sides that a piece of land of such
slight depth could not be put to any very valuable use." 59  The case
was tried by referees under the Street Opening Act of 1903. Testi-
money was received that the frontage to a depth of 107 feet (which in-
,cluded the entire 33-foot depth taking) had a value of $1.64 per square
foot. The back land was valued at $0.25 per square foot. Of course,
in the after condition, the remainder still had the same 107 foot depth
of more valuable frontage-it had just been shifted rearward on the
property. There was no claim for severance damages to the remainder
and hence the sole issue was the fair market value of the part taken.
GO See 1ORGEL, supra note 43, § 52 at 236-7.
G7 Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, wherein the court observed by way of example
the following at 574-5:
If, for example, by the widening of a street, the part which lies next to the
street, being the most valuable part of the land, is taken for the public.use,
and what was before in the rear becomes the front part, and upon a wider
street, and thereby of greater value than the whole was before, it is neither
just in itself, nor required by the Constitution, that the owner should be en-
titled both to receive the full value of the part taken, considered as front land,
and to retain the increase in value of the back land, which has been made
front land by the same taking.
58 1 Cal. 2d 572 (1934).
59 Id. at 574.
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The referees awarded $8,614.00 based upon the value of the part
taken as a part of the entire tract. The referees used an average value
of $0.32 per square foot. The gist of the property owner's argument
on appeal was that he should have been awarded $1.64 per square
foot. He argued that shifting the frontage strip further back on the
remainder might have resulted in a special benefit to the remainder, but
this could not offset the value of the part taken. The supreme court,
however, rejected this argument and, in so doing, made the following
analysis:
Assume the aggregate value of the land as an entire tract before the
taking computed at 32 cents per squre foot to be $500,000, after the
taking the appellant retains acreage of the value of $491,386, plus
$8,614, the damages awarded, which together make it whole. That
is, after the taking the appellant still has the equivalent of $500,-
000. Should the appellant prevail in its contention that it is en-
titled to $43,952, instead of $8,614, it would have the value of the
retained portion, or $491,386, plus $43,952, which would leave it
in possession of $35,338 more than it had originally.,;
The court further held that the ultimate question before the referees,
and the only question they were authorized to answer, was "What is the
value of this parcel of land, as it lies before us, being part of an undivided
tract under single ownership?""'
It thus appears that, as of the time of the Allen case, California was
still committed to the entire parcel concept wherein the sum of the parts
should not exceed the value of the whole-with the singular statutory
exception of where special benefits exceed severance damages. But
any such conclusion is no longer valid for in People v. Silveira,02 the
court partially adopted the rule permitting independent valuation of the
part taken.
In Silveira, the trial court directed the jury to determine whether
part of the defendant's tract taken (approximately 9 acres from a total
of 260 acres) "had a greater value considered as a separate and distinct
piece of property disconnected from the remainder of the tract or when
considered as a fraction or part of the entire tract, and to take the
higher market value." 63  The appellate court affirmed and this ruling
60 Id. at 576-7.
61 Id. at 575.
62 236 Cal. App. 2d 604 (1965).
63 Id. at 616. The actual instruction given read as follows:
You must determine whether it has a greater value considered as a separate
and distinct piece of property disconnected from the remainder of the tract,
or whether the part taken has a greater value considered as a fraction or part of
the entire tract. You must then select from those two valuation methods
whichever one of the two produces the higher and greater market value, and
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has subsequently been followed. 64 The court concluded that the "value
as part of the whole" concept was a rule designed "to protect the con-
demnee", and that since it was "obviously for the condemnee's bene-
fit", the jury should be allowed to consider the value of the part taken
as an independent parcel if this would result in a higher valuation.
This results in a new situation in California where a property owner
will be left with a greater total value "after" than he had "before", in
addition to the situation where benefits exceed damages. Attributing to
the part taken an amount greater than its value as a part of the whole
will necessarily lead to the sum of the parts exceeding the value of the
whole. This sort of unjust enrichment was, of course, the specific thing
which the supreme court in Allen was atiempting to avoid. Although
the court in Silveira attempted to distinguish Allen as "just and proper
under the particular facts of that case," 5 it would seem that the basic
concepts in Allen and Silveira can only be viewed as diametrically
opposed.
What effect Slveira wil! have on Allen is hard to say, but it has been
suggested that Silveira has added a "new dimension" to partial taking
cases. 66 The holding in Silveira obviously departs radically from the
entire parcel concept and the "modified before and after" rule which had
heretofore been followed in California and used generally by appraisers
in appraising public acquisitions.6 7
This case has already created some serious problems in the California
trial courts. Most California appraisers analyze values by following the
previously mentioned procedure wherein the entire property is first
valued, a value is then assigned to the part taken, and then values are
assigned to the part not taken in its "before" and "after" conditions for
make your awards accordingly. The landowner is entitled to the highest
value.
04 People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Princess Parks Estate, Inc.,
270 Cal. App. 2d 876 (1969), wherein the court held that the Silveira instruction em-
bodied a correct statement of the law. In this case the jury was instructed that it
was to value the part taken as a part of the whole and was also instructed in ac-
cordance with the Silveira independent parcel theory. The appellate court found no
error in this inconsistency for the reason that apparently all witnesses considered that
the parcel taken, viewed as an independent parcel, would have a lesser value. Thus, the
court concluded that the jury was left with the single alternative of valuing the part
taken as part of the whole and was not "misled or confused" by the Silveira instruc-
tion. This may be a correct legal assumption, but one can wonder if the average layjuror could really be expected to listen to such conflicting instructions and have any
understanding at all as to what was expected of him.
60 People v. Silveira, 236 Cal. App. 2d 604, 618 (1965).
60 Clarke, Easement and Partial Taking Valuation Problems, 20 HASTINGS L.J.
517 (1969). See also Matteoni, The Silveira Case and Reestablishment of the Higher
Zone of Value on the Remainder, 20 HASTiNGS L.J. 537 (1969).
67 See SCHmu-Z, supra note 49, at 97-99. See also Deer Valley Industrial Park
Development and Lease Company v. State of Arizona, 5 Ariz. App. 150, 424 P. 2d
192, 199 (1967), which expressly rejected the holding in Silveira "as being unrealistic".
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the purpose of determining damages. To follow Silveira means that on
cross-examination it will be revealed that mathematically the value of
the property remaining when added to the appraiser's figures for the
part taken and severance damages will be more than the total value of
the property he had placed on the property in the first instance. To
avoid the unpleasantness of this sort of examination, an appraiser can
sidestep the "modified before and after" analysis by simply testifying
to severance damages in a lump sum. This is permitted. 8 But, unless
his severance damages are limited to readily identifiable cost-of-cure
items that are obviously not in excess of the otherwise loss in market
value, he will be subject to cross-examination as to how he can deter-
mine a loss in value to property upon which he has placed no value.
Thus, a property owner's attorney or appraiser who seeks a higher
total award by use of the Silveira instruction must be most careful. In
fact, the instruction can backfire. For example, where the part taken is
from a greater depth of valuable frontage (as in Allen), and where the
construction of the improvement will also cause damage to a portion of
the valuable frontage in the remainder (unlike Allen), use of the Sil-
veira instruction might successfully secure a higher award for the part
taken, but considerably less for damages. If we assume that this taking
is for a highway widening, where a portion of the valuable frontage is
being taken, but where a limitation on access will also impair the
value of that portion of the more valuable frontage on the remainder,
should the jury conclude that the part taken must be viewed as a separate
and independent parcel, it may quickly conclude that the remainder
must likewise be viewed as a separate and independent parcel. Viewed
as such, the remainder would not have an area of valuable frontage to
be detrimentally affected. In fact, viewed as such, the remainder would
have no frontage at all. Severance damages would be nonexistent.
Another problem which has been encountered with Silveira relates
to the admissibility of sales. By statute in California, the price at
which other property is sold is admissible in evidence if the sale prop-
erty is first determined to be "comparable" to the "property being
valued." 69  Size is a specified factor in determining comparability.
Obviously, the "property being valued" under the independent par-
cel approach is not the entire parcel but is, instead, the part taken.
However, for the purpose of determining severance damages, the
"property being valued" can only refer to the remaining property.
When the size of the remainder is disproportionate to the size of the
68 People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390 (1943); San Bernardino County Flood
Control District v. Sweet, 255 Cal. App. 2d 889, 904 (1967).
69 CAL. EVID. CODE § 816.
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part taken, application of the new rule would seem to require the con-
sideration of one set of sales for use in valuing the part taken, and an
entirely separate set of sales for analyzing the damages to the remainder.
This result, should it become established law, can only lead to length-
ened trials and added jury confusion. 70
Fortunately, the independent parcel rule will not have wide applica-
tion for it does not generally benefit the property owner. Most condem-
nations will thus be tried on a "value as a part of the whole" theory.
But where this theory is followed, there are still many possibilities
of jury confusion. As stated by one author: "If the 'value of the
part taken' includes some allowance for its value as a part of the
entire tract, what elements of damage are not thus included, so that
they must be allowed for in a separate award of 'damages to the re-
mainder'?"' 71  Thus, if a backyard is removed from a parcel of resi-
dential property, it will be given a value because of its use in con-
nection with the remainder. If the jury at the same time assesses dam-
ages to the remainder for loss of the yard, double compensation obvi-
ously results. If the jury makes a legitimate effort to divide the loss
between the part taken and severance damages, the question becomes
-how does one as a practical matter segregate such a loss?
This problem can be particularly acute where only an easement,
such as for a power line, is being taken. In this type of case, the prop-
erty owner will be left with the full use of his property, subject only to
whatever burdens may be imposed by the construction and use of the
easement. Logically, the net diminution in the value of the owner's
entire tract resulting from imposition of the easement should be the
measure of compensation.7" But this, of course, is not in accord with
the separate assessment requirement of Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1248. Such a problem was faced in Pacific Gas and Electric Com-
pany v. Hufford.73  There the jury was provided with a verdict form
which required that it separate the net loss between the part taken and
severance damages.74  The jury was instructed that in assessing sever-
ance damages, it was to consider the effect of the construction on de-
fendants' entire tract of land. On appeal, the condemner asserted that
70 That this is already the law is suggested in Clarke, Easement and Partial
Taking Valuation Problems, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 517, at 532 (1969).
71 1 ORGEL, supra note 43, § 52 at 241.
72 See Taylor, The Right to Take-The Right to Take the Fee or Any Lesser
Interest, I PAc. L.J. 555, 574 (1970).
73 49 Cal. 2d 545 (1957).
74 Id. at 550:
We, the jury in the above entitled case, find:
1. That the market value of the easements taken by plaintiff is - dollars.
2. That the severance damage to the remainder of defendants' property
is - dollars.
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severance damages applied only to the remaining lands outside the right
of way limits of the easement; that the loss in value to the easement area
itself constituted the take; and that hence the trial court's instruction
permitted the jury to assess damages to the easement area twice, result-
ing in double recovery.
The court concluded that "in a strict definitive sense, ' 75 the value of
the part taken is measured by the loss in value of the land under the
easement, whereas severance damages relate to the loss in value to the
remaining lands outside the easement. However, the court felt that
since the defendants' witness used both the total "before and after"
method as well as the separate assessment method, and correlated his
figures to reach the same ultimate total, no prejudice resulted. Plain-
tiffs' witnesses also used both methods and the court concluded that the
technical error was not likely to mislead the jury. It can legitimately be
asked, however, why it should ever be necessary for the appraisers
and jurors to be involved with the two appraisal methods when in
reality the only question when an easement is taken is one of net di-
minution in value. Requiring what can only be viewed as an arbi-
trary breakdown between the value of the property taken and severance
damages serves no purpose other than to technically comply with the
code section and possibly to keep our already overburdened appellate
courts busy with appeals such as that in Hufford.
Another illustration of how inextricably involved a case can be under
the present rule is contained in People v. Hayward Building Materials
Company.76  There a conceptual problem was bound to develop be-
cause the parties stipulated to the value of the part taken and left the
sole issue of severance damages to the jury. In this case, the entire
property, consisting of a total area of 84,898 square feet, was used
as a building materials plant and sales yard. The condemner took
18,992 sauare feet, together with certain building improvements essen-
tial to the overall operation. The parties agreed that the fair market
value of the part taken, including improvements, was $42,520.00.
Both parties thus faced a subsidiary question of whether the remainder
in its "after" condition was or could be made capable of accommodating
the continued function of a building materials plant and sales yard.
All agreed that certain improvements located on the part taken would
have to be rebuilt on the remaining parcel so that the business opera-
tion could continue. 77 Needless to say, the condemner, having paid
75 Id. at 554.
76 213 Cal. App. 2d 457 (1963).
77 The complicated nature of the valuation testimony can best be understood by
reference to the case itself.
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for the improvements as part of the-stipulated value, presented its case
in a carefully guarded manner so as to prevent the jury from again
compensating for their loss as part of the severance damage analysis.
This was done primarily by focusing attention on the before value of,
the entire property. Thus, one witness placed the value of the entire
property before the taking at $246,000.00, and deducted therefrom his
value of the remainder property after the taking of $192,200.00.
The difference represented the total reduction in value which the wit-
ness rounded out at $54,000.00. From this, the witness deducted the
stipulated value of the land and improvements ($42,500) and gave the
remaining balance of $11,500.00 as a severance damage figure. Of
course, one of the factors considered by the witness in analyzing the
after value of the remainder was the cost of the preparation of the re-
mainder so as to accommodate the reconstruction of the improvements
taken. But he allowed nothing for the replaced improvements them-
selves. To this, the defendant property owners objected on appeal.
However, the appellate court concluded that the analysis by the plain-
tiffs witness was properly designed "so as to eliminate a double recov-
ery."27 8
The Hayward Building Materials Company case thus serves well to
illustrate the practical difficulties which so often arise in determining
whether the real injury done-there the taking of improvements es-
sential to overall property value-is to be resolved in the taking or
damage determinations. The basic fallacy of the separate assessment
rule is the underlying assumption that the overall loss can be logically
divided and that market data can be applied in the analysis. Regard-
less of whether the "independent parcel" or "value as a part of the
whole" approaches are used, the jury is still dealing with but a single in-
jury to property which it must, as stated in a recent Arizona case, 79
somehow segregate into ". . two measures of damages to be awarded
-that for the parcel taken and that for the severance damages."80  The
Arizona court said:
78 See note 76 supra, at 468. For a similar problem in an out-of-state case, see
Commonwealth v. Blanton, 352 S.W.2d 545 (Ky. 1961), which involved the taking of
an apartment house parking lot. The court said at 547:
It must be obvious, however, that if in valuing the land taken its use as a
.specific facility is considered, and the damages for the taking are thus com-
puted on the basis that the owner is being deprived of that facility, the loss of
the facility taken cannot be again considered as part of the damages to the
remainder of the tract. It seems to us that the situation here is no different
from that in Smick v. Commonwealth, Ky., 268 S.W.2d 424, where the land-
owner's garage was taken and paid for, and he sought to recover in addition
the expense of building a new garage.
79 Deer Valley Industrial Park Development and Lease Company v. State of
Arizona, 5 Ariz. App. 150, 424 P.2d 192 (1967).
80 424 P.2d at 197.
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Though easy to express in words, the application of these words
to the realities of the real estate market results in a breaking down of
concepts, because in so attempting to separate the two portions of
the property affected, appraisals are being placed on things not
bought or sold as such in the market place.8 '
The problems involved under the separate assessment rule are largely
avoided under the federal rule where the total loss, whatever it may be,
is ascertained by computing the before value and by then deducting the
after value. There is no need to segregate the loss into the value of
the parcel taken and damage elements. Where special benefits are not
an issue (and that is frequently the case), it seems clear that the federal
rule provides a simpler method of reaching a proper answer even if one
wants to preserve the "no set-off' rule for benefits. It certainly avoids
the objection that a jury ". . may include in 'damages to the remain-
der' a part of the very injury which it incorporates in 'value of the part
taken.' 2)S2
PROBLEMS IN SEGREGATING DAMAGES 'XND BENEFITS
Although the average appraiser or juror may have problems in at-
tempting to separately analyze that portion of the total injury attribut-
able solely to the part taken, an even greater problem is frequently
encountered in attempting to assess severance damages apart from spe-
cial benefits. The task will not generally be too difficult if physically
different parts of the remaining property are affected differently. Thus,
if one portion is cut off from street access, changing its highest and best
use from residential to agricultural, and another portion is to be lo-
cated on a new interchange, changing its highest and best use from
residential to commercial, market data will ordinarily be available upon
which to base a conclusion. But what does one do where the beneficial
and damaging features cannot be readily segregated? They may be so
interrelated as to be inseparable as a practical matter. Thus, the ques-
tion often becomes one of determining when the damage analysis ends
and the benefit analysis begins.
This is a problem that has long plagued appraisers in condemnation
cases and existing law simply does not adequately answer the legiti-
mate inquiry as to how to proceed. Assume, for example, that a parcel
of land fronts on a highway and has access to it. Assume also that the
highway is being converted into a freeway but that, as part of the pro-
posed plan of construction, another access road such as a frontage road,
will be constructed to serve the property. Does the appraiser simply
81 Id.
'I ORGEL, supra note 43, § 52 at 238.
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look to the property in its before and after conditions and, in so doing,
seek to determine the net increase or decrease in the value of the re-
mainder as a result of the overall change in access? If he does so, is he
failing to separately analyze benefits in violation of Code of Civil
Procedure section 1248?
This very problem was faced in People v. Anderson.s3  There a
portion of the remainder would have been landlocked by freeway con-
struction, except for a newly constructed frontage road leading to it.
One of the condemner's appraisers testified that the remainder, with the
new access, would be specially benefited. Although the trial court
judge had agreed to instruct on special benefits, he somehow over-
looked the written instruction while charging the jury. Upon discovery
of his oversight, he gave a somewhat vaguely stated informal instruc-
tion. The jury returned a zero verdict for special benefits and the con-
demner appealed asserting a failure to properly instruct.
The appellate court, in analyzing the issue, noted that "... when
the only special benefit claimed is some part of the plan of construction
which lessens the severance damage, an analysis of the wording of
section 1248 will show that literal compliance therewith is difficult
.... -"4 The court then concluded that if an appraiser's method for
computing severance damages is to compare the "before" and "after"
market values of the severed remainder, ". . . the arithmetical problem
to be performed becomes an impossible one."8  The court, found,
however, that it would not have to struggle "in the morass thus created
and the dilemma thus presented. ' 86 All of the appraisers who testified
had considered the mitigating effect of the frontage road in assessing
damages.8 7 The court felt that the jury also considered the value of the
frontage road as a factor lessening damages, and thus gave full credit to
its beneficial features. The court, therefore, was unable to find any
prejudice.
Although the court expressly refrained from deciding the question, the
Anderson case does imply that, despite the requirements of Code of
Civil Procedure section 1248, separate analysis may not be necessary
where the beneficial feature is constructed to lessen damages. What
33 236 Cal. App. 2d 683 (1965).
84 Id. at 696. (Emphasis by the court.)
s5 Id. at 696. (Emphasis by the court.)
86 id. at 697.
87 Id. at 696:
In their "after" valuation they considered the value of the westerly remain-
der NOT in a landlocked condition which would have been its situation
but for the frontage road; instead they considered its market value WITH
the frontage road. Had they considered the value of land-locked land, the
"after" value necessarily would have been zero, or nearly so, since the only
access thereto would be by boat or helicopter. (Emphasis by the court.)
Pacific Law Tournal / Vol. 2
does one do, however, when the issues are equally interrelated but
the mitigation aspect is not involved? Consider, for example, a most
typical situation where a new freeway is constructed with interchanges
and related access facilities through acreage land adaptable to residen-
tial subdivision purposes. Typically, the property owner will argue that
freeway traffic greatly impairs the value of the remainder, or that it at
least impairs the value of that portion of the remainder in immediate
proximity to the freeway. The condemner, however, will likely argue
that overall the freeway is most beneficial, opening up new access to
the property and providing a new transportation facility which will
greatly enhance the value of the remainder in the eyes of a purchaser
desiring to develop the property. Indeed, the very increase in traffic
complained of by the condemnee may be asserted as a benenficial fea-
ture by the condemner.8 The initial battle lines will be drawn around
the question of whether the damages are compensable,8 9 and the bene-
fits are special. 90
If we assume, however, that the damaging aspects are compensable
and the beneficial aspects are special, the question remains-must they
be separately valued by the condemnation appraiser and must he place
a separate dollar and cents figure on each element? If the appraiser at-
tempts to do so, one thing is certain: When he goes into the market to
undertake his investigation, the people he interviews will in all likeli-
hood consider his questions as unrelated to anything that happens in
the real market. One may compare freeway lands with nonfreeway
88 See City of Hayward v. Unger, 194 Cal. App. 2d 516 (1961).
89 See City of Berkeley v. Von Adelung, 214 Cal. App. 2d 791 (1963) and
People v. Presley, 239 Cal. App. 2d 309 (1966), indicating that damages from
traffic resulting from fumes and noise are noncompensable as involving "general"
damages. But see Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State of California, 70 Cal. 2d 282 (1969) and
City of Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist Church, 1 Cal. App. 3d 384 (1969), indicating
that where construction on the part taken interferes with amenities which the property
formerly enjoyed, such as freedom from noise, this may be a proper element for an
appraiser to consider in support of his opinion of severance damages.
90 Improved access and transportation facilities have been held to result in
special, rather than general, benefits. See People v. Edgar, 219 Cal. App. 2d 381
(1963), where the court said at 384:
Benefits resulting from improved access and the better accommodation of
transportation constitute special benefits for which an allowance by a jury in
eminent domain is proper. [Citations Omitted.]
See also People v. Hurd, 205 Cal. App. 2d 16 (1962); People v. Bond, 231 Cal. App.
2d 435 (1964); and Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District v. W.P. Roduner
Cattle and Farming Company, 268 Cal. App. 2d 199 (1968), wherein the court in fn. 2,
at 205 quoted from NIcHoLs, supra note 27, § 8.6203 at 68, as follows:
There is a well-recognized distinction between general and special benefits.
The former is what is enjoyed by the general public of the community,
through which the highway passes, whether it touches their property or not.
An improved system of highways generally enhances all property which is
fairly accessible to it. But that which borders it, or through which it ex-
tends, has benefits by reason of that circumstance which are not shared by
those which are not so situated.
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lands, but how does one find a market reaction to just the detrimental
aspects of such a freeway without regard to its beneficial aspects? If
the appraiser seeks out a developer of similar acreage along freeways,
and asks for his reaction as to only the detrimental aspects, he may be
told that absent the freeway, the developer would not even be interestsed
in the property. The appraiser, however, in logical pursuit of his elu-
sive quest may inquire if the lands immediately adjacent to the free-
way are of a lesser value. To this the developer may respond that lots
fronting on the freeway may sell slower, or may even sell for less, and
that he would, therefore, attribute a lesser value to this area. But this
does not mean that such area is damaged. Nor does such a response
answer the appraiser's question. The answer merely provides a com-
parison of values adjacent to the freeway in the after condition with
values further removed from the freeway--also in the after condition.
It may be that the developer is saying no more than that the entire prop-
erty has been enhanced in value, but that the acreage further removed
from adverse proximity factors will secure a greater degree of enhance-
ment.
The appraiser, who needs to secure a comparison of values in the
after condition with values in the before condition, will likely next ask
a question designed to determine how much loss in value is caused to
the area immediately adjacent to the freeway without regard to the bene-
ficial effects of the freeway. But no matter how this inquiry is framed,
to the developer, unfamiliar with the sophisticated analyses required in
condemnation appraising, the question will undoubtedly sound like:
"How much has this property been hurt by the freeway, but give your
answer disregarding the freeway?" By the time the appraiser starts
drawing a distinction between special and general benefits, the developer
may decide that he no longer has time for such mental gymnastics.
A partial answer to the appraiser's predicament may be found in cer-
tain cases where it was concluded that if the after value of the remainder
is equal to or greater than its before value, the proper conclusion is that
there is simply no damage and consequently nothing to offset.
Thus, in People v. Schultz Company,9 a case involving conversion
of an existing highway to a freeway with an outer highway, all three of
the plaintiffs' expert witnesses testified that when the freeway was con-
structed there would be no severance damages at all. They also testi-
fied that when so constructed there would actually be material benefits
to the remaining land for which each witness gave his own individual
appraisal. When asked to explain their opinions, each witness testified
91 123 Cal. App. 2d 925 (1954).
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that construction of the freeway and outer highway would more than
offset the loss of the present means of access to the highway. On
appeal, it was argued that the witnesses failed to segregate severance
damages from benefits in violation of Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1248. The appellate court explained that the witnesses testi-
fied to "no severance damages" and that they also testified there
would be "some benefits". The court concluded that "[w]hen they
testified that severance damages would be more than offset by benefits,
they were testifying precisely as required by the section."' 2
It is hard to say what the result would have been if the appraisers
had concluded that the beneficial features did not quite offset the dam-
aging features and testified to a small net loss in value without separately
analyzing damages and benefits. This question may, however, be
answered by another case.
In People v. Al. G. Smith Company Ltd.,93 the plaintiff sought to
acquire a right of way in fee and access rights to the existing highway.
The defendants made no claim for the value of the part taken and thus
the sole question was loss in value to the remainder. The property own-
ers would continue to have access to the highway through three sep-
arate 30-foot openings. In the before condition, the highway consisted
of only two lanes with a "borrow pit" lying between the traveled way
and the adjacent property. The property owners had to cross over cul-
veils in order to secure access to their abutting land. The new highway
would have improved traffic lanes with 8-foot shoulders. Moreover,
a drop along the edge of the pavement on the old highway would be
eliminated. Experts for the plaintiff condemner testified that in their
opinion there was no damage by the taking of access and that "consid-
ering the size of appellants' tract the benefits from the new highway
would offset any possible damage. 094
92 Id. at 936.
93 86 Cal. App. 2d 308 (1948).
94 Id. at 310. In so holding, the court relied on Collier v. Merced Irrigation
District, 213 Cal. 554 (1931), which involved the taking of riparian rights pursuant toCode of Civil Procedure section 1248, subdivision 4, which specially provides for thededuction of benefits from "any damages awarded the owner." The jury was not
required to separately assess benefits. The court held at 571-2 that the "only way to
measure the injury done by an invasion of the riparian right is to ascertain the de-preciation in market value of the physical property." The court concluded that "the
only way to show that depreciation is to show the conseqences to the land fromthe construction and operation of the public works" and that in a case of this type,
"it is impossible to separate or disregard the item of benefits in making up a verdict
or judgment." The court thus upheld what in effect constituted an offset of benefits
against the "take" noting at 572 that if the part taken were land, rather than an intangi-ble right, and "had a physical independent existence . . . it would then be possible todisregard the item of benefits when appraising the specific property appropriated."But, of course, the impossibility contemplated by the court with reference to theimpact of the construction would be equally applicable to a determination of loss in
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The jury returned a verdict of zero severance damages. They were
not asked to consider benefits because benefits, as a separate item, had
not been testified to. As might be anticipated, the property owners
argued on appeal that the condemner's testimony was improper. The
appellate court, however, affirmed. It should be noted that, as in the
Schultz Company case, the condemner's appraisers concluded that bend-
fits outweighed damages. But the reasoning of the court in Al. G. Smith
Company Ltd. would have been equally applicable to a reverse situation
leading to a net loss figure, for the court said that the only way to
measure the injury done was to "ascertain the depreciation in market
value of the physical property from the construction and operation of the
public improvement", and that "[iln so doing, it is impossible to
disregard the item of benefits accruing to such land by reason
thereof.' ' 5 (Emphasis added.)
The Al. G. Smith Company case also states, however, that "[i]f the
abutting land is not depreciated in market value, there is no legal injury
and consequently no right to compensation."96  Thus, the case is not
entirely clear as to whether separate analysis of the beneficial features
would have been required if the net result was some overall depreciation
in value. But what was viewed as impossible in the first instance would
be equally impossible in the second.
In reaching its decision, the court, in Al. G. Smith Company, relied
on an 1892 New York case, Bohm v. Metropolitan Elevated Rail-
way Company,97 which serves well to illustrate that the complexities
of the problem are not new to condemnation law. Bohm involved the
taking of easements of light, air and view by the construction of an ele-
vated railway. The appellate court concluded that the easements as
such were of nominal value and that the real issue was that of damages
to the remainder. The trial court, sitting without a jury, had been re-
quested to make findings that the benefits from the construction re-
sulted in an overall increase in value. The trial court refused such
findings and the appeal followed. The appellate court agreed with the
railroad's assertion that the evidence of increase in value was uncontra-
dicted and went on to consider whether the beneficial features which
caused such increase should have been considered below. In reversing,
the court made the following observation:
If the taking by the railroad actually had the effect of en-
value to the remainder, and a separation of damages from benefits whether the take
be tangible or intangible.
95 86 Cal. App. 2d 308, 311.
D6 Id.
97 129 N.Y. 576, 29 N.E. 802 (1892).
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hancing the value of the remaining land, the inquiry as to the
amount of loss that might otherwise have been occasioned (if there
had not happened to be the actual benefit) would be the purest guess
and speculation in the world, and, even when arrived at, would be
but proof of what might have happened if something else had
not occured which prevented it, and caused the contrary to hap-
pen.9
s
The court went on to hold that the case did not involve offsetting injury
against benefits, but instead involved a process of "discovering whether
in reality there has been any injury" at all.99
As one might expect, the property owners in Bohm argued that the
increase in value reflected general benefits as well as special benefits.
Thus the court went on to consider a question, neither raised nor de-
cided in Al. G. Smith Company, as to whether there is a legal injury if,
notwithstanding the adverse features of the project, the remaining land
will increase in value due to general benefits. In other words, must the
appraiser seek to determine what the damage would have been, absent
the general benefits? The court stated that it was "wholly unable to see
the least materiality" of the distinction between general and special
benefits as applied to the facts before it, and concluded that if there
would be no loss in value, there could be no injury. The court said that
any inquiry as to "whether the land would have been injured if certain
circumstances had not occurred, which not only prevented such injury,
but enhanced its value, is wholly immaterial."' 10
The extent to which the reasoning of this case finds application in
California law is hard to say. But the logic of the case in holding that a
property owner is not entitled to damages where his remaining property
is actually increased in value cannot be denied. However, in Pierpont
Inn, Inc. v. State of California,' the supreme court, quoting from its
earlier decision in Beveridge v. Lewis,10 2 implied that reducing sever-
ance damages by general benefits would deny equal protection of the
law. But the question raised by Bohm is whether there is any damage
at all to be offset.
In any event, it does appear that under the Anderson, Schultz Com-
pany and Al. G. Smith Company cases, the California appraiser does
not always have to separately analyze the damaging and beneficial fea-
tures of a project. But the question of when and under what circum-
stances he is required to do so is far from clear. An additional, and
98 29 N.E. at 805.
99 29 N.E. at 806.
100 Id.
101 70 Cal. 2d 282, 296 (1969).
102 137 Cal. 619, 625 (1902).
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pethaps more important question, is that of what can be expected of the
jurors when different appraisers adopt different approaches, and the jury
must somehow be expected to resolve them. The existing state of the
law obviously does not provide answers.
By way of comparison, it is interesting to note that no such com-
plexities have occurred in inverse condemnation cases-at least where
no taking is involved.'" 3 Although it has been said that the "principles
which affect the parties' rights in an inverse condemnation suit are
the same as those in an eminent domain action,"'1 4 the courts have
generally disregarded the rule requiring separate analyses of dam-
ages and benefits in this type of case. 1 5
CONCLUSION
As late as 1965, the California Legislature reinforced the California
separate assessment requirement by amending Code of Civil Procedure
section 1248 to specifically prohibit offsetting benefits against the part
taken. 100 It should not be assumed, however, that this amendment
represented anything more than a desire to maintain a status quo with
regard to what most persons had assumed to be the rule all along.107
In fact, at the time, the California Law Revision Commission, at the di-
rection of the legislature, had commenced an overall study of condem-
nation law.' 08 The Commission has completed considerable work in
the field, but has yet to make specific recommendations regarding val-
103 Article I, section 14, of the California Constitution, unlike the 5th amendment
to the United States Constitution, requires compensation for the taking or damaging of
private property. Thus where construction of a public project interferes with a
legally recognized property right, the owner may have a remedy against the public
agency whether or not there has been an actual taking. See Albers v. County of Los
Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250 (1965). Such cases are typically called inverse condemna-
tions.
104 Breidert v. Southern Pacific Company, 61 Cal. 2d 659, n. 1 at 663 (1964).
105 See Van Alstyne, Just Compensation of Intangible Detriment: Criteria for
Legislative Modifications in California, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 491 (1969), wherein it is
stated in n. 96, at 516:
It is recognized that absent a partial taking ... the California inverse de-
cisions seldom discuss the benefit problem, since special benefits are ordi-
narily assimilated into evidence relating to the extent of claimed dimunition
of value without the need for separate identification. [Citations Omitted.] ...
Consistency suggests the appropriateness, in inverse cases where differences
in result might be significant, of seeking to isolate special from general bene-
fits so that the latter may be excluded from the computation of compensa-
tion. It should be noted, however, that the special benefit rule, in most
applications, is beset with serious ambiguities and definitional uncertainties.
[Citations Omitted.] These conceptual difficulties would be eliminated by
replacing the present rule with one based on the federal 'before-and-after' test
for compensable loss. [Citations Omitted.]
100 CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 51, p. 932, § 1.
107 See Contra Costa County Water District v. Zuckerman Construction Com-
pany, 240 Cal. App. 2d 908 (1966).
108 See Gleaves, Special Benefits in Eminent Domain; Phantom of the Opera,
40 CAL. S.B.J. 245 (1965).
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uation. Hopefully, this will soon be forthcoming, for it is most ap-
parent that there is a need to remove some of the braintwisting com-
plexities from condemnation trials. As stated in the dissent to one re-
cent case:10 9
In this era of the law explosion no phase of judicial administra-
tion is more ripe for reform than eminent domain valuation.
Trial judges, lawyers and appraisers are willy-nilly players in a su-
percharged psychodrama designed to lure twelve mystified citizens
into a technical decision transcending their common denominator of
capacity and experience. The victor's profit is often less than the
public's cost of maintaining the court during the days and weeks of
trial.
One aspect of the existing California law which should be carefully
scrutinized is the separate assessment requirement. As shown above,
such a requirement makes a demand on the average juror which he fre-
quently is not capable of dealing with. On at least two occasions, our
appellate courts have concluded that literal compliance with the require-
ment is "impossible". 1 0 As one leading writer in the field has stated,
"it has caused the courts to demand of the juries . . . that they find a
tertium quid that is simply non-existent.""'
In a recent analysis of the problem in Arizona, the court, after analyz-
ing the development of the law under a statute similar to the California
statute, commented:
it is no wonder that juries are presented with such variations in testi-
mony that it is difficult to comprehend that the testifiers purport
to be members of a common profession. Tremendous variations in
verdicts thus result, making eminent domain litigation an attrac-
tive game of chance for those armed with the more imaginative
and persuasive professional witnesses. 112
It is, therefore, believed that strong consideration should be given to
adoption in California of the federal before and after rule. The only
possible argument against such a rule is that it permits an offsetting of
benefits against the value of the part taken. But if "just compensation"
is the goal, and if this concept means "just" not only to the property
owner, but to the public taxpayer as well, there is no reason why the
property owner should be compensated in an amount which will result
in his making a profit at public expense. It is thus not surprising that
109 State of California v. Wherity, 275 A.C.A. 279, 290, 79 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1969).
110 qee People v. Anderson, 236 Cal. App. 2d 683 (1965) and People v. Al.
G. Smith Company Ltd., 86 Cal. App. 2d 308 (1948).
111 1 ORGEL, supra note 43, § 52 at 238.
112 Deer Valley Industrial Park Development & Lease Company v. State of
Arizona, 5 Ariz. App. 150, 424 P.2d 192 (1967).
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the majority of commentators who have studied the problem have con-
cluded that the federal rule is the better one even though it does result in
benefits being offset against the value of the part taken.1 '
113 See, e.g., ORGEr, supra note 43, § 52 at 238; Yager, supra note 27; Gleaves,
supra note 17; Haar and Hering, supra note 20; Note, Benefits and Just Compensation in
California, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 764 (1969).
